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We identify the causal effect of gender bias on access to finance. We extract an 
exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of US 
immigrants on questions about the role of women in society. We then investigate a 
detailed dataset on small business firms from 17 countries and find that the inherited 
component of gender bias is associated with gender-based discrimination in the credit 
market of the immigrants' country of origin. In particular, in countries with higher gender 
bias, female-owned firms are more frequently discouraged from applying for bank credit 
and are more reliant on informal finance.  
JEL classification: G21, J16, N32, Z13. 
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A woman cannot be herself in the society of the present day, which is an exclusively 
masculine society, with laws framed by men and with a judicial system that judges 
feminine conduct from a masculine point of view. 
Henrik Ibsen, Ibsen’s Workshop, 1912 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic research has focused intensely in recent years on the link between 
culture – which Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) define as the customary beliefs and 
values that are transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation – and 
economic outcomes. Scholars have provided strong evidence that various beliefs and 
preferences, rooted in the cultural experience of economic agents, are related to a range 
of economic phenomena, ranging from growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and financial 
development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004), to trade (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2009) and regulation (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer, 2010). 
Having established a robust correlation, the research effort has turned to 
identifying the causal impact of culture on economic outcomes. Doing so requires taking 
two crucial steps. First, one needs to show that a narrow subset of the entire range of 
cultural beliefs and preferences has a directly measurable impact on a specific economic 
phenomenon. Second, one needs to show that not only the contemporaneous component 
of these beliefs and preferences, but also their predetermined component, has an impact 
on the economic outcome in case. 
This paper aims to take both steps concurrently by investigating the impact of a 
well-defined cultural belief – i.e., the belief that women are inferior to men, or the 
“gender bias” – on a well-defined economic outcome – i.e., access to external finance. 
More specifically, we investigate the impact of the gender bias on the credit market 
experience of female versus male firm-owners. We first study whether, compared to male 
firm-owners, females: (1) are more often denied credit; (2) are more often discouraged 
2 
 
from applying for credit; (3) rely less on bank credit and more on alternative sources of 
finance, such as trade credit, in the financing of the operations of their firm; and (4) are 
offered inferior loan terms. Second, we investigate whether these practices are stronger in 
countries with a stronger gender bias. 
Establishing a causal link from gender bias to credit market outcomes is at the 
heart of our paper. To extract the predetermined component of the gender bias across our 
sample countries, we borrow the empirical strategy from Algan and Cahuc (2010) who 
employ information on cultural attitudes of US-born descendants of European immigrants 
to extract measures of inherited trust and investigate its effect on economic growth. We 
focus on answers provided by U.S. descendants of European immigrants to survey 
questions about the proper place of women in society. For instance, we compare 
Americans of German, Polish, or Russian origin whose ancestors immigrated to the US in 
1960. Since it is well established that social capital is transmitted from parents to children 
(Putnam, 2000; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006), the degree of the gender bias of a 
person born in the U.S. that has parents that were born in Russia is a good proxy for the 
degree of gender bias of his parents, and by extension a good proxy for the predetermined 
component of gender bias in contemporaneous Russia. 
This measurement strategy allows us to isolate the inherited component of the 
gender bias for 17 European countries. Our measure of inherited gender bias is clearly 
superior – in a causal sense – to similar measures that are commonly extracted from 
contemporaneous surveys of cultural attitudes in these countries, such as the World 
Values Survey. Next, we match our country-specific proxy for gender bias to information 
on the credit market experience by 5,905 firm-owners – 4,193 males and 1,712 females – 
in these countries, and test whether variations in inherited cultural biases are mapped into 
variations in access to bank credit and in the terms on granted loans. We focus on small 
individually owned or family owned firms to make sure that if one of the owners of the 
firm is female, she has actual influence in the firm’s decisions. 
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We find that cross-country differences in gender bias explain a substantial 
proportion of the variation in access to credit by female firm-owners, but not in the loan 
terms of the ultimately successful loan applications. In particular, in countries with a 
higher inherited gender bias relative to the base country – Poland – and comparing female 
owners to male owners, the former group of owners: 1) more often do not apply for a 
loan because they believe they will not get one, and 2) finance a lower portion of their 
firm’s operating expenses with bank credit and a higher portion with trade credit. 
However, for granted loans, we find no differences in rates, collateral requirements, or 
the negotiation time involved. The evidence thus implies that the negative effect of 
gender bias in credit markets is transmitted through more restricted access to credit rather 
than through a higher price of credit. Our results are observed even when country fixed 
effects (which capture all time-invariant country variation within the high versus low 
gender-bias group), a wide range of firm-level characteristics, and a nearly exhaustive set 
of characteristics capturing the national business environment are included. Overall, our 
evidence is consistent with Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2002) and Muravyev, 
Schäfer, and Talavera (2009) who find that female-owned firms are less likely to apply 
for and/or to obtain bank credit than male-owned firms, both in the US and in an 
international context. However, to our knowledge, our paper is the first to make the 
empirical link between gender, economic outcomes, and gender bias. 
This paper’s results are robust to one potentially confounding influence. In 
particular, a higher gender bias can over time trigger changes in the skill composition of 
the labor force through the selection of workers into education or employment, or through 
migration, for instance (Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). One potential implication is that 
in countries with high gender bias, female firm-owners’ set of skills required to run a firm 
could be inferior. If banks know this, they would be rationally rationing female-owned 
firms in the credit markets, and so the line between statistical and taste-based 
discrimination would be blurred. However, we verify that there is no statistical difference 
in firm growth between female-owned and male-owned firms. Even stronger than that, 
we show that in high gender-bias countries, there is no statistical difference in growth 
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rates between constrained female-owned firms and unconstrained male-owned firms. We 
therefore argue that our estimates indeed pick up the effect of taste-based discrimination 
rather than the rationing of potentially inferior projects by banks in countries with a 
pronounced gender bias. 
We are not the first to analyze the impact of cultural beliefs and preferences on 
economic outcomes. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanneti (1993) show that social capital is a 
good predictor of government performance across Italian regions. Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales show that trust in society affects phenomena like entrepreneurship (2006) and 
trade (2009). Algan and Cahuc (2009) and Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (2011) analyze the 
relationship between trust and institutions and find that, in general, countries whose 
citizens trust each other less tend to put in place more restrictive institutions. Aghion, 
Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) explain this result by arguing that distrust increases 
the public demand for government intervention whereas regulation in itself discourages 
the formation of trust. Tabellini (2008) analyzes the role of culture on the per-capita-
income of European regions by using institutional history and literacy rates as an 
instrument for contemporaneous trust. Algan and Cahuc (2010) use the inherited trust of 
US immigrants to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth. We borrow 
their identification strategy, i.e., the use of the cultural attitudes of U.S.-born descendants 
of non-U.S. born ancestors to extract the predetermined component of culture in the 
ancestral countries. Our intended contribution to this body of work is that we look at 
gender bias rather than at trust, and try to uncover one of the mechanisms through which 
culture affects economic growth, namely, through the differential access to credit. 
The second related strand of the literature analyzes the relation between well-
defined characteristics of the credit market and various social outcomes. Garmaise and 
Moskowitz (2006) show that bank mergers result in substantially higher property crime 
rates, because lower access to finance depresses local economic growth and raises the 
relative benefit of illegal activity. Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010) show that bank 
deregulation is associated with a tighter distribution of income, though in their case it is 
not the access to credit but the increase in the relative demand for low-skilled workers 
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due to stimulated entrepreneurship and increased education that boosts incomes in the 
lower part of the income distribution. While we do not explore the link between the 
structure of the credit market and economic outcomes, our work is naturally related to 
these studies in that we study how gender bias is transmitted into entrepreneurship 
through the channel of bank lending. 
Our paper also relates to the literature on taste-based discrimination pioneered by 
Becker (1957). This literature has focused mainly on the labor market consequences of 
various physical attributes. For example, Hammermesh and Biddle (1994) and Mobius 
and Rosenblat (2006) find that physical beauty has a positive effect on earnings. Cawley 
(2004) finds that obesity lowers the wages of white females. Persico, Postlewaite, and 
Silverman (2004) and Case and Paxson (2008) establish a robust effect of height on 
earnings, the latter through the channel of higher cognitive abilities. Johnston (2010) 
finds a substantial female wage premium from being blonde. Various authors have 
looked into the effect of discrimination – as well as of its interaction with various market 
developments - on the white-black wage gap (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Rodgers and 
Sprigs, 1996; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov, 2005; 
Charles and Guryan, 2008; Levine and Rubinstein, 2011). 
Conceptually similar to our study is the research on the effect of discrimination on 
the male-female wage gap (Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske, 2003), and on 
female market participation (Goldin and Rouse, 2000), among others. This research in 
general confirms the existence of a sizeable earnings gender gap. For example, 
controlling for education, experience, personal characteristics, city and region, 
occupation, industry, government employment, and part-time status, Altonji and Blank 
(1999) find that only about 27 percent of the gender wage gap is explained by differences 
in observable characteristics. We argue that the difference in income between females 
and males can be related to cultural beliefs, with access to credit being one channel 
through which the gender bias depresses the earnings of women in society. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper to test for a direct link between the predetermined 
cultural component of gender discrimination and a well-defined economic outcome. 
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Most related to our paper is the empirical research on gender and credit market 
outcomes. Using US data on small businesses, Asiedu, Freeman, and Nti-Addae (2012) 
find that while race is a significant predictor of both access to credit and the cost of 
credit, gender is not. Belluci, Borisov, and Zazzaro (2010) find that female firm-owners 
in Italy face tighter credit constraints when dealing with one individual bank, even though 
they do not pay higher interest rates. Using the Italian Credit Registry, however, Alesina, 
Lotti, and Mistrulli (2013) find that after controlling for entrepreneurial risk, female 
borrowers do pay higher rates, especially when their guarantor is a female too. Using a 
large cross-country sample, Muravyev, Schäfer, and Talavera (2012) find that female 
firm owners are more likely to be denied bank credit and that they tend to pay higher 
rates on bank loans, while for a number of Sub-Saharan countries Aterido, Beck, and 
Iacovone (2011) find no evidence of gender discrimination. The first three papers use 
data from one country only and so unlike ours are unable to relate access to credit to the 
variation in cultural biases across countries. Relative to the latter two papers, we are not 
only able to link gender to credit outcomes in an international context, but also to 
investigate the effect of gender bias on that link. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 discusses 
our identification strategy. Our estimates of the effect of inherited cultural biases on 
credit market outcomes are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
In this section, we discuss the various data sources used in this paper. 
A. General Social Survey 
Our measure of the inherited gender bias is constructed using data on U.S. born 
descendants of non-U.S. born forebears. The information itself is provided by the General 
Social Survey database (GSS). The database covers the period 1972-2010. The data 
contains a range of demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, religion, marital 
status, education, and employment status of the respondents. Importantly for our 
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purposes, it provides information on the birthplace and the country of origin of the 
respondents’ forebears since 1977. The respective GSS variable “ETHNIC” is defined as 
the answer to the question: “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors 
come?” The countries of origin cover almost all European countries, alongside Canada, 
Mexico, India, and Africa (an aggregate category). We use information on U.S. citizens 
whose ancestors came from abroad, regardless of when they came to the U.S. 
Our proxy for gender bias is derived from the variable “FEFAM” which is defined 
by the answer to following question: “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is 
the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” The 
answers are given on a scale from 1 to 4. From these answers, we construct a variable 
“Gender bias” that is equal to 1 if the respondent answered “Strongly agree” or “Agree”, 
and equal to 0 if the respondent answered “Disagree” or “Strongly disagree”. There are a 
total of 20,992 responses in the GSS, of which 8,715 (41.5 percent) responded “Strongly 
agree” or “Agree”, and 12,277 (58.5 percent) responded “Disagree” or “Strongly 
disagree”.1 6,472 of those respondents come from 17 countries that overlap with the 
countries in our firm-level dataset which we describe next. 
B. Firm-level data 
Our firm-level data come from the 2004/2005 wave of the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), administered jointly by the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).2 We exclude data 
from other waves of this survey as they do not provide comparable information on credit 
access. The 2004 and 2005 BEEPS surveyed 9,655 firms from 27 countries in eastern 
                                                 
1 Algan and Cahuc (2010) use an identical strategy to extract the predetermined component of trust from 
GSS answers on the question whether people in general can be trusted. 
2 For a detailed discussion of the data, see, e.g., Brown, Ongena, Popov and Yeşin (2011), Popov and Udell 
(2012), and Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013). 
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Europe and central Asia, and 4,453 firms from 5 Western European countries, 
respectively. We narrow this sample down to 17 countries for which we also have GSS 
data.3 In addition to that, we exclude all firms that are not sole proprietorships. This 
allows us to focus on small individually- or family-owned firms. In this way, we make 
sure that if one of the owners of the firm is female, she has actual influence in the firm’s 
decisions. The number of firms that report all the information we require for this study 
ranges from 141 in Bosnia, Croatia, and Lithuania, to 763 in Poland.4  
B.1. Credit access 
To measure credit access by the firm we employ four different measures. We 
employ the self-reported Share working capital financed with bank credit and the Share 
working capital financed with trade credit as two direct measures of “past” access to 
credit. The survey questionnaire also includes three questions about firm financing which 
allow us to further describe firms’ current access to credit. Firms are first asked if they 
have a loan or not. Those firms without a loan are then asked in Q47a whether they (a) 
did not apply for a loan or (b) applied for a loan, but the application was turned down or 
(c) have a loan application pending.5 
Those firms that did not apply for a loan are then asked in Q47b to list the main 
reasons why they did not do so. To this question there are multiple possible answers: (a) 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, due to the geographic scope of the survey, we are missing information from many 
European countries that were pioneers in women’s rights, such as the Scandinavian countries. 
4 The survey aimed to achieve representativeness in terms of the size of firms it surveyed: Roughly two 
thirds of the firms surveyed are “small”, i.e., they have less than 20 workers. By design the survey only 
covers established firms, i.e., firms which have been in business for at least three years. This implies that 
our sample does not allow us to examine credit access for really young or start-up firms. Moreover, our 
results are subject to sample selection, in the sense that we only observe firms which had sufficient internal 
or external funds to survive for at least three years. 
5 Despite the care by the surveyors to solicit the correct answers, it is not entirely impossible that males 
underreport past loan rejection or application discouragement more than females. Yet it seems rather 
unlikely to us that the (mis-)reporting of the shares of working capital would be gender-specific. 
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The firm does not need a loan, (b) application procedures are too burdensome, (c) 
collateral requirements are too high, (d) interest rates are too high, (e) informal payments 
are necessary, or (f) the firm did not think their application would be approved. From the 
above questions we establish our two indicators of current credit access. The variable 
Firm discouraged from applying for a loan is a dummy variable which equals 1 for those 
firms which did not apply for a loan, listing (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) as a potential reason. 
For all firms which did apply for a loan, or did not apply because of reason (a), the 
variable equals 0. The variable Loan application rejected is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 for those firms which applied for a loan but their application was turned down, 
and equals 0 for those firms which applied for a loan and have a loan. Firms with pending 
applications (i.e., less than 1 percent) are treated as missing. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our indicators of past and current credit 
access by country. The table shows that there are substantial cross-country differences in 
credit access across the countries in our sample. For instance, while only 4 percent of the 
average Russian firm’s working capital is financed with bank credit, in Ireland bank 
credit accounts for almost a quarter (24 percent). The fraction of firms that are 
discouraged from applying for a loan varies between 2 percent in Ireland and 53 percent 
in Macedonia. The cross-country variation in loan rejection rates is similarly substantial, 
with 1 percent of loan applications rejected in Bosnia versus 16 percent in the Czech 
Republic. In general, loan rejections rates appear low, suggesting that in our sample, 
restriction in access to finance happen mostly in the dimension of discouragement, and 
that firms apply for a loan only when they are reasonably certain that their application 
will not be rejected.  
The availability of data on discouraged firms is one of the main strengths of the 
BEEPS, allowing us to separate firms that did not apply for a loan because they do not 
need one from those that did not apply although they need one. The reasons for not 
applying for a loan vary widely across countries in Eastern Europe. The share of firms 
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which do not apply because they do not need a loan varies from 47 percent in Yugoslavia 
to 81 percent in Slovenia. The share of firms that are discouraged by burdensome 
procedures varies from 2 percent in Slovakia to 16 percent in Macedonia. Whereas only 1 
percent of firms in Estonia feel discouraged because they anticipate rejection, this share is 
10 percent in Lithuania. In addition to that, discouragement may signal an actual rejection 
if firms decide not to file an application after an informal conversation with the loan 
officer (see Duca and Rosenthal, 1993). 
B.2. Loan terms 
Alongside variables describing various aspects of credit availability, we make use 
of a number of variables that describe the terms of granted bank loans. Firms with 
outstanding bank credit provide many details on their most recent loan. In particular, 
firms in BEEPS are asked about the loan rate, the maturity, the currency denomination, 
the collateral requirements, and the time it took to negotiate the last bank loan.  
< Insert Table 2 here > 
Table 2 provides the sample summary statistics by country for the most relevant 
loan characteristics. In the full sample it takes an average of 19.5 days to negotiate a loan, 
but only 8 days in Spain and more than a month in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. 
The overwhelming majority of loans in all countries are collateralized, but there is great 
deal of variation, with the share of collateralized loans ranging from 56 percent in Greece 
and Slovenia to 95 percent in Bosnia and Macedonia. Collateral itself averages 149 
percent of the loan. In euro area countries, at most 2 percent of the loans are in foreign 
currency compared to 45 percent in Macedonia. Finally, the nominal average annualized 
rate of loans is 985 basis points, ranging from 474 basis points in Ireland to 1,794 basis 
points in Romania. 
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B.3. Firm characteristics 
Recent empirical research by Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009), Brown, 
Ongena, and Yeşin (2009), Brown, Ongena, Yeşin, and Popov (2011), Popov and Udell 
(2012), and Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2012) using the BEEPS data, and by Chakravarty 
and Xiang (2009) using the similar Investment Climate Survey data, has shown that firm 
size, ownership, activity, product market competition, accounting standards, bank use and 
internal financing, and obstacles to doing business affect credit access and credit terms. 
Following the above literature we relate our indicators of credit access to firm-
level indicators of firm size (Small firm, Medium firm, and Large firm), privatization 
history (Originally private), export activities (Exporter), the number of local product 
market competitors of the firm (Competition), access to government subsidies 
(Subsidized), and accounting standards (Audited). We further feature an indicator of the 
sector in which the firm operates (by SIC 1-digit). Crucially, we incorporate information 
on the firm owner’s gender (Female). 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
The definitions of these firm-level variables are provided in the Appendix. 
Summary statistics for our firm-level variables are presented in Table 3. The table shows 
substantial cross-country variation within our sample in terms of ownership by gender. 
For example, fewer than 1 in 5 firms in Macedonia, Slovakia, and Spain have a female 
owner, while 1 in 2 in Portugal does. Apart from that, the average firm in our sample is 
small, originally private, has no access to foreign product markets, receives no subsidies 
from local or central governments, and does not have its financial statements certified by 
an external auditor. 
C. Country-level data 
As in Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000), de Haas and Lelyveld (2006), Giannetti and 
Ongena (2008), and Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009), we pay attention to how access 
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to credit may be determined by market and institutional characteristics. In particular, we 
relate access to credit and loan terms to foreign ownership in the banking sector, to credit 
information sharing, and creditors’ rights, as well as to various macroeconomic and 
financial developments. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for our country-level variables. Unsurprisingly, 
foreign bank ownership is very low in countries with large domestic banks (like Germany 
and Spain) and very high in eastern European countries which underwent bank 
privatizations in the 1990s. Western European countries which have large and developed 
financial sectors and are euro area members also have the highest private credit/GDP 
ratios, the highest degree of information sharing, the highest GDP per capita, and the 
lowest inflation. Conversely, Eastern European countries have on average higher GDP 
growth rates, although the highest growth rates in the sample are in Greece and Ireland. 
The central variable in our study is the country-specific gender bias. The variable is 
calculated using the answers by descendants of European immigrants in the US to the 
GSS question on the role of women in society (see Section 2.A). We describe the 
estimating procedure we employ to calculate this variable in the next section, but the 
general idea is that after controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics, we 
interpret the coefficient on the country-of-origin fixed effect as the inherited gender bias. 
In an OLS context, this gender bias is calculated relative to a reference country. We 
choose that country to be the median one, namely Poland. As Table 4 makes it clear, 
being a descendant of parents coming from the countries in former Yugoslavia results in 
a higher gender bias than being the descendant of Polish parents, while being a 
descendant of, for instance, Irish parents results in a lower gender bias. 
3. Identification strategy 
In this section, we discuss the construction of our measure of country-specific 
inherited gender bias, as well as the identification strategy. 
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A. Inherited gender bias 
The construction of the country-specific measure of gender bias is based on the 
GSS. To simplify things, we do not focus on one particular generation, but take the 
answers of all respondents in the survey, regardless of what generation immigrants they 
are. Thus, inherited trust in 2005 corresponds to the trust inherited by U.S.-born children 
of European immigrants, born at any point after 1910.6 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of the gender bias for the full sample.7 The 
gender bias of Polish-Americans is used as the reference group. The regression includes 
country-of-ancestry dummies, whose estimated coefficients are then used as the country-
specific proxies for the gender bias. In addition to those, the regression controls for a host 
of individual-specific characteristics: Age, age squared, education, gender, religion, 
employment status, and income. The total number of observations for which data is 
available on all relevant variables is 6,472. 
The results imply that the gender bias increases with age and decreases with 
education. Males have a higher gender bias, and so do both Protestants and Catholics 
(relative to the reference group, which is comprised of atheists, Muslims, Hindus, native-
Americans, Christian-orthodox, Judaists, and other). Both employed and unemployed 
persons have a lower gender bias relative to the control group (which is comprised of 
retired, in school, keeping house, and other). Finally, respondents with a higher income 
have a significantly lower gender bias. 
                                                 
6 Paulson and Osili (2008) show that the ancestral beliefs of U.S. immigrants decline over time, suggesting 
that gender bias may be more pronounced for U.S. citizens who immigrated to the U.S. more recently. We 
perform tests using the latest wave of immigrants only, and our results are robust to this alternative 
measurement of the inherited gender bias. 
7 The probit regression yields similar results. 
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Turning to the countries in our sample, the lowest gender bias in our sample – all 
else equal - is exhibited by the descendant of immigrants from Ireland, who are 7.8 
percentage points less likely to agree that “it is better if the man pursues a professional 
career and the woman takes care of the house and family” than the descendants of the 
immigrants from Poland (the reference country). At the other extreme, descendants of the 
immigrants from Yugoslavia are 17.1 percentage points more likely to agree with this 
claim than the reference country descendants. We match the coefficient on the 
Yugoslavia dummy to all five countries in the sample that by 2005 former Yugoslavia 
had broken into (i.e., Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia, comprised 
of Serbia and Montenegro). We also assign the estimate on the Czechoslovakia dummy to 
both the Czech Republic and to Slovakia. 
In general, we find that 7 countries have a lower gender bias than Poland, namely, 
the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Russia, and Slovakia. In 
future tests, we pool these countries into the group of “Low gender bias” countries. The 
rest of the countries, including Poland, we classify as the “High gender bias” countries. 
B. Empirical strategy 
In order to tease out the causal effect of culture on credit market outcomes, we 
estimate a simple model where we relate credit access and loan characteristics to our 
measure of inherited gender bias, as well as to a host of firm-level characteristics that 
may capture aspects of the demand for and the supply of credit. Specifically, we estimate 
the following two models:  
iscscisciscisc XFemaleaccessCredit εβββ +∆++= 321_     (1) 
and 
isctsctctisctisctisct YXFemaletermLoan εββββ +∆+++= 4321_      (2) 
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In model (1), we evaluate the effect of the gender of the owner of firm i in sector s 
in country c on the probability of being rejected or discouraged in credit markets, as well 
as on the share of capital financed from bank versus non-bank sources.8 The equation 
controls for firm (X) characteristics, and it includes sector and country fixed effects ( sc∆ ). 
These effects control for any market and/or sector unobservables that are common across 
all firms.  
In model (2), we evaluate the effect of gender on the terms of granted loans (days 
to negotiate the loan, collateral, currency denomination, loan rate). Although there is only 
one loan per firm, this regression has a panel component because loans were received at 
different points in time, which allows us to control for the time-varying component of the 
various country-level developments (Y). The regressions also include different 
combinations of country, industry, and time fixed effects.  
In the two equations, iscε  and isctε , respectively, are error terms composed of a 
person-specific idiosyncratic shock and any unobservable sector-country (sector-country-
year) fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors by country to allow for arbitrary 
within-country correlations in the errors. In terms of the parameter estimates on gender, 
the estimate of 1β  is the causal impact of being female on access to credit or on the terms 
of granted loans, respectively. 
Next, we evaluate the effect of gender on credit market outcomes accounting for 
gender bias. For simplicity of illustration, yet without loss of generality, assume that 
countries can be divided into those with a high gender bias and those where society does 
not derive disutility from treating females as equal to males. We create a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the US descendants of emigrants from the respective country have a higher 
gender bias than the US descendants of emigrants from the reference country (Poland), 
                                                 
8 In the case of our dummy variables for credit access, we employ a probit regression, but the results are 
robust to using a logit model. 
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and to 0 if they have a lower gender bias. Then, we modify the above equations in the 
following way: 
iscscisciscciscisc XFemaleBiasFemaleaccessCredit εββββ +∆+++⋅= 4321_  (3) 
and 
isctsctsciscisctciscisct YXFemaleBiasFemaletermLoan εβββββ +∆++++⋅= 54321_ (4) 
In these specifications, 2β  measures the causal impact of being female on access 
to credit or on the terms of granted loans, respectively, and 21 ββ +  measures the effect of 
being female on credit market outcomes or on the terms of granted loans in countries 
with high gender bias. The direct effect of gender bias, which is common to everyone in 
the respective group of countries, is subsumed in the country fixed effects. 
4. Results 
A. Gender and credit market outcomes 
We now turn to the correlation between gender and credit market outcomes. This 
is a first step in our analysis necessary to establish whether banks indeed discriminate 
against female firm owners, as in Hertz (2011) and Muravyev, Schäfer, and Talavera 
(2012) for example. 
A.1. Gender and credit access  
We first investigate the determinants of credit access. Table 6 reports the 
empirical estimates from Model (1). We first focus on the sources of financing of 
working capital. We focus on bank credit and on trade credit. Theoretical work on the 
pecking order in corporate finance suggests that firms prefer credit from banks to credit 
from suppliers/consumers because of its lower price (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997). We 
make two salient assumptions, i.e., that female firm-owners have the same preferences 
over the pecking order and that they face the same probability of success when applying 
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for trade credit. Then, female owners having relatively lower access to cheaper bank 
credit and having to rely relatively more on more expensive trade credit would be one 
manifestation of taste-based discrimination. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Column (1) investigates the determinants of bank credit finance and column (2) 
the determinants of trade credit finance. Consistent with prior literature, all else equal, 
small firms and sole proprietorships are more credit constrained, potentially indicating a 
lower ability to tap alternative capital markets; firms that export part of their production 
are less constrained in terms of both types of finance, potentially signalling the 
willingness of banks and customers/suppliers to lend to firms with higher growth 
prospects; and audited firms are less credit constrained, implying gains from the 
reduction of informational opacity in terms of credit market access. 
Turning to our primary variable of interest, we find that firms with female owners 
finance a strictly lower share of their capital expenses with bank credit, and a strictly 
higher share of their capital expenses with trade credit. Being female results in a 3 
percentage points lower share of working capital financed with bank credit. Numerically, 
this corresponds to 12 percent of the sample standard deviation of this variable. Likewise, 
being female results in a 1 percentage point lower share of working capital being 
financed with bank credit, which corresponds to 5 percent of the sample standard 
deviation. One way to think about the economic significance of these results is that a 
male owner of a firm which does not have its financial accounts certified by an external 
auditor will finance a larger share of its working capital with bank credit than a female 
owner of a fully transparent firm. This example suggests that the effect of being female 
on credit market access is not simply negative, but also sizeable. 
In the next two columns, we investigate the determinants of being completely shut 
out of credit markets, either because the firm was discouraged from applying (column 
(3)) or because it applied but its application was rejected (column (4)). We confirm the 
sign of the firm covariates, namely, small firms are both rejected and discouraged more 
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often, while exporters and audited firms are less often credit constrained. Importantly, we 
also confirm our previous results in terms of gender inequality. In particular, female-
owned firms have a higher probability of not applying for a loan because they were 
discouraged (column (3)), although this effect is not significant. Out of firms that actually 
apply for a loan, ceteris paribus, female-owned ones have a statistically higher probability 
of having their loan application rejected by the banks. In terms of the marginal effect, a 
firm at the sample mean has a 2 percentage points higher probability of having its 
application rejected if it is female-owned. 
A.2. Gender and loan terms 
Next, we turn to the determinants of the terms on granted loans. As in Alesina, 
Lotti, and Mistrulli (2013) we now test, for example, the hypothesis that banks do not 
price discriminate against females. However, we go beyond previous studies in that in 
addition to loan rates, we look at the effect of gender on the time it takes to negotiate the 
loan, on the loan’s collateral, and on its currency denomination. 
<Insert Table 7 here > 
For a start, we find that the variables which matter for credit access (as in Table 6) 
also have an impact on the terms of granted loans. In particular, small firms pay higher 
rates on bank loans (column (5)), albeit with higher probability these loans are not 
collateralized. On the contrary, exporters are charged lower rates by their bank, they are 
more often given loans in a foreign currency (column (4)), and they take a shorter time to 
negotiate the loan (column (1)). In terms of the time-varying country-level variables, 
banks in countries with higher foreign ownership of banks and with superior creditors’ 
rights take less time to negotiate a loan (column (1)), and in countries with deeper 
financial markets and with broader information sharing, firms have a higher probability 
of obtaining a non-collateralized loan. 
Turning to our main variable of interest, we find that gender matters only for the 
speed with which the bank grants a loan. In particular, female-owned firms obtain a loan 
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in 2 days less than male-owned firms (given a sample average of 19.5 days). Therefore, 
we find no evidence that banks discriminate against females by screening them longer 
than identical male-owned firms. In terms of the other loan terms, we also find no 
evidence of discrimination: Females actually have a higher chance of obtaining an un-
collateralized loan (column (1)) and pay lower rates (column (5)); however, these effects 
are not significant in a statistical sense. 
We conclude that our data provides some evidence of discrimination against female 
firm owners, but only in terms of credit access: Female-owned firms are more often 
discouraged from applying for a bank loan, and are more often rejected once they do, 
with the effect being strongly significant in the first case. Such firms also end up using 
less bank credit and more trade credit. However, for firms that ultimately do obtain a 
loan, we find no discrimination against female owners in terms of a wide range of loan 
terms. 
B. Inherited cultural bias, gender, and credit market outcomes 
We now turn to the correlation between gender bias, gender, and credit market 
outcomes. The idea of this section is to establish whether bankers’ decisions to ration 
female-owned firms that are similar to male-owned firms in terms of creditworthiness are 
driven by a gender bias. 
B.1. Inherited cultural bias, gender, and credit access 
In order to investigating the impact of the inherited cultural bias on credit access 
and on loan terms for female firm-owners, we now include an interaction term of Gender 
bias with Female owner. We expect the estimated coefficients to indicate that stronger 
gender bias worsens credit access and loan terms for females. The estimates in Table 8 
broadly confirm this prior. For example the estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
in column (1) indicates that a stronger gender bias in the country moderately (though not 
statistically significantly) decreases the share of working capital that is financed with 
bank credit in firms with female owners. But the estimate in column (2) implies that a 
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strong bias sharply (and statistically significantly) increases the share financed with trade 
credit. In the latter case the estimated coefficient implies that if a firm with a female 
owner would move from Ireland to Serbia, for example, trade credit financing would 
increase by 2.3 percentage points more than if the owner of the firms was a male. This is 
a very large additional increase given that the share at the mean firm in the sample is only 
6 percent. 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
Column (3) shows that female owners are also more discouraged applying for a 
loan in countries with a wide gender bias. Again moving from Ireland to Serbia increases 
discouragement by female owners by 14 percentage points more than male owners, 
sizeable given that the mean probability of discouragement across all firms is 23 percent.9 
Finally, the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term in column (4), though not 
statistically significant, is also economically relevant.  
B.1. Inherited cultural bias, gender, and loan terms 
Next we assess if the inherited cultural bias has an impact on the loan terms firms 
with female owners obtain (versus firms owned by males). In contrast to our findings on 
credit access, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term of the Gender bias and the 
Female owner dummy is statistically insignificant in all but one case when a loan term is 
the dependent variable. This finding corresponds to the lack of explanatory power of the 
Female owner dummy in explaining loan terms. 
< Insert Table 9 here > 
                                                 
9 Female owners in strong gender bias countries may be discouraged from applying for a loan, not because 
they correctly anticipate rejection due to taste-based discrimination, but because they “internalize” the 
gender bias and feel less confident applying per se. As obtaining trade credit is also often a matter of 
requesting and negotiating it (yet we observe trade credit to increase) we do not think such a lack of 
confidence necessarily applies to the female owners in our sample. 
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C. Gender and firm performance 
The results so far indicate that access to credit is far more problematic for female 
than for male firm-owners, especially in countries where the gender bias is strong. Loan 
terms on the other hand are not different between female- and male-owned firms. These 
findings suggest taste-based gender discrimination that solely limits access. Once access 
to credit through a non-discriminatory loan officer is possible, potentially because the 
loan officer herself is a female (Beck, Behr, and Madestam, 2012), similar loan terms 
suggest that female-owned firms are deemed to be similar to male-owned firms. 
To further investigate this point, i.e., that it is not some unobserved firm 
characteristic such as owner expected future performance correlated with gender, that is 
reflected in credit access, we analyse the difference in firm growth across gender and 
across gender bias. For example, women may be more risk-averse (Powel and Ansic, 
1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998), although more recent experimental evidence has 
suggested that gender-specific risk behaviour may be due to differences in opportunity 
sets rather than risk attitudes (Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachniger, 1999). 
We first regress the logarithm of realised firm sales growth in the past three years 
on all firm-level characteristics in Table 6 (with the exception of Female), as well as the 
industry and country dummies. Then we subtract the logarithm of sales growth predicted 
by this regression from actual sales growth. The resulting variable, Residual log sales 
growth, should capture the portion of firm growth that is explained by gender and by 
access to credit. Then, we compare, in a simple two-sided Mann-Whitney t-test, the 
average Residual log sales growth between gender groups and across countries with low 
and high gender bias. 
< Insert Table 10 here > 
Table 10 implies that in low gender bias countries (i.e., where inherited gender 
bias is below Poland’s), banks are efficient in screening applicants of both genders (Panel 
A). Both female-owned and male-owned firms grow faster, in terms of sales, if they have 
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access to bank credit compared with identical firms that are credit constrained. The 
difference is significant at the 10 percent level in both cases. However, in high gender 
bias countries (Panel B), there is no statistical difference between in the growth rates of 
constrained versus unconstrained firms, implying that banks are relatively more 
inefficient in screening potential borrowers. In fact, constrained female-owned firms 
actually grow faster than unconstrained female-owned firms, although not statistically so.  
An even stricter test is to compare the sales growth of male-owned firms that are 
unconstrained in their credit access to female-owned firms that are constrained, and to do 
so this in high gender bias countries where also in other areas of economic activity 
female-owned firms may be discriminated against. We do so in Panel C. We find that, 
despite both these hurdles for female-owned firms, the sales growth rate of constrained 
female-owned and unconstrained male-owned firms are not statistically different (3.8 
versus 1.5 percent). This test strongly suggests that the results we document in Table 8 in 
countries with a high gender bias are driven by a reluctance to extend credit to females, 
rather than by the fact that females have lower entrepreneurial ability and banks correctly 
anticipate this. 
5. Conclusion 
We analyse differential credit access and terms across 17 countries for female- 
versus male-owned using responses from 5,905 small family firms in the 2004/2005 
wave of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). We 
find that firms owned by females have more difficulties obtaining credit than otherwise 
similar firms owned by males but that once credit is obtained loan terms are not different. 
The differential access to credit to the females’ disadvantage is exacerbated in countries 
where the inherited cultural gender bias is severe. In addition, the female-owned firms do 
not underperform male-owned firms in terms of sales growth, even when not obtaining 
credit or when based in high gender-bias countries. 
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In sum, these findings suggest taste-based gender discrimination that limits access 
to credit to firms owned by females. Once access to credit through a non-discriminatory 
bank is possible, similar loan terms suggest female-owned firms are assessed to be 
similar to male-owned firms, and this assessment is correct because their sales growth 
also turns out to be the same. This also suggests that the discrimination is random, i.e., it 
is not the case that loan officers select only the best female-owned firms while lending 
also to mediocre male-owned firms. 
The contribution of our paper therefore consists in linking the severity of the 
inherited cultural gender bias as it exists across countries to specific outcomes in the 
credit market, in particular credit access. All results are consistent with random gender 
discrimination. Policies in strong bias countries that enable and facilitate lending to 
female-owned firms are therefore called for and in particular and beyond doubt will 
enhance overall firm performance. One possibility could be to stimulate banks to recruit 
and train female loan officers (Beck, Behr, and Guettler, 2013) that may be less subject to 
a gender bias. Alternatively, banks could be incentivized over some time period by 
subsidies to lend to deserving female-owned firms that now are for no good reason 
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with bank credit 
Share working 
capital financed 
with trade credit 
Firm discouraged 
from applying  




Bosnia 141 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.01 
Croatia 141 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.02 
Czech Republic 253 0.07 0.06 0.36 0.16 
Germany 778 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 
Greece 498 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.01 
Hungary 462 0.12 0.05 0.25 0.03 
Ireland 395 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.02 
Lithuania 141 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.05 
Macedonia 153 0.04 0.06 0.53 0.04 
Poland 763 0.06 0.04 0.42 0.09 
Portugal 370 0.08 0.04 0.31 0.03 
Romania 393 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.12 
Russia 434 0.04 0.07 0.42 0.08 
Slovakia 142 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.03 
Slovenia 132 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.01 
Spain 501 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.02 
Yugoslavia 208 0.08 0.05 0.39 0.03 
Total 5,905 0.11 0.06 0.23 0.05 
Note: This table presents statistics on firm credit access, by country. Share working capital financed with bank 
credit is the proportion of the firm’s working capital that has been financed by borrowing from private 
commercial banks in the past 12 months. Share working capital financed with trade credit is the proportion of 
the firm’s working capital that has been financed with trade credit from suppliers or customers in the past 12 
months. Firm discouraged from applying for a loan is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm did not apply for a bank 
loan because it thought it felt discouraged by credit market conditions, and equal to 0 otherwise (all dummies 
will have these two values; so the “equal to 0 otherwise” will no longer be included below). Loan application 
rejected is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm applied for credit and had its loan application rejected. See Appendix 













% of loan 




Bosnia 18.48 0.05 203.48 0.01 10.30 
Croatia 27.02 0.25 160.36 0.29 8.13 
Czech Republic 32.91 0.18 122.20 0.03 10.04 
Germany 18.72 0.06 123.69 0.02 7.74 
Greece 17.42 0.44 132.72 0.04 7.35 
Hungary 22.53 0.06 168.04 0.21 13.22 
Ireland 16.12 0.37 158.22 0.02 4.74 
Lithuania 27.30 0.19 135.15 0.33 5.93 
Macedonia 22.00 0.05 198.05 0.45 11.37 
Poland 22.77 0.20 153.18 0.12 13.06 
Portugal 10.99 0.41 120.12 0.00 7.02 
Romania 21.21 0.06 153.12 0.38 17.94 
Russia 19.80 0.11 148.91 0.13 18.07 
Slovakia 35.67 0.23 144.31 0.02 8.07 
Slovenia 14.22 0.44 157.24 0.22 6.48 
Spain 8.22 0.28 134.79 0.01 6.51 
Yugoslavia 22.40 0.07 193.36 0.17 13.66 
Total 19.52 0.20 148.85 0.11 9.85 
Note: This table presents statistics on firm financing, by country. Days to negotiate loan is the number of days it 
took to negotiate the loan with the bank from the day of application. Loan not collateralized is a dummy equal to 
1 if the financing of the loan did not require collateral. Collateral as % of loan is the value of the collateral 
required as a percentage of the loan value. Loan in foreign currency is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is 
denominated in foreign currency. Annualized loan rate is the loan’s annual rate of interest. See Appendix for 
























Table 3. Firm-level explanatory variables 
 
Country Female owner Small firm Large firm Originally private Exporter Competition Subsidized Audited 
Bosnia 0.26 0.67 0.04 0.83 0.32 0.62 0.01 0.45 
Croatia 0.20 0.82 0.06 0.80 0.30 0.51 0.15 0.35 
Czech Republic 0.22 0.87 0.03 0.92 0.22 0.45 0.06 0.27 
Germany 0.20 0.85 0.06 0.99 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.47 
Greece 0.25 0.83 0.06 0.99 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.46 
Hungary 0.40 0.81 0.02 0.88 0.31 0.65 0.15 0.70 
Ireland 0.41 0.86 0.03 0.99 0.29 0.58 0.08 0.94 
Lithuania 0.26 0.74 0.04 0.79 0.32 0.64 0.06 0.36 
Macedonia 0.18 0.82 0.06 0.84 0.27 0.65 0.02 0.24 
Poland 0.34 0.87 0.02 0.95 0.21 0.65 0.08 0.30 
Portugal 0.50 0.91 0.04 0.99 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.74 
Romania 0.28 0.72 0.04 0.85 0.20 0.41 0.05 0.35 
Russia 0.28 0.75 0.07 0.86 0.13 0.22 0.01 0.35 
Slovakia 0.18 0.80 0.03 0.93 0.27 0.82 0.06 0.43 
Slovenia 0.35 0.92 0.02 0.86 0.42 0.68 0.10 0.20 
Spain 0.19 0.88 0.06 0.97 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.27 
Yugoslavia 0.25 0.82 0.06 0.89 0.25 0.56 0.05 0.24 
Total 0.29 0.83 0.04 0.93 0.21 0.35 0.08 0.44 
Note: This table presents firm-level statistics, by country. All firms in the final sample are individually owned or family-owned. Female owner is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the principal owner (or one of the principal owners) is a female. Small firm is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has less than 20 employees. Large firm is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm has more than 100 employees. Originally private is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was founded as a private company rather than 
through privatization of a previously state-owned one. Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has access to foreign markets. Competition is a dummy equal to 
1 if the firm faces “fairly”, “very”, or “extremely” strong competition. Subsidized is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received subsidies during the last 3 years 
from the central or local government. Audited is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm employs external auditing services. Omitted category for firm size is Medium 
































Bosnia 0.171 0.81 16.38 0.53 0.74 8.46 1.17 3.29 6.83 2.82 
Croatia 0.171 0.91 50.73 0.63 0.00 9.36 3.06 4.18 5.61 3.77 
Czech Republic -0.058 0.85 32.00 0.60 1.92 9.85 1.78 7.00 6.63 2.59 
Germany -0.042 0.06 115.44 0.68 6.00 10.28 0.62 8.00 4.03 1.50 
Greece 0.037 0.23 59.16 0.93 4.00 10.06 4.58 3.00 8.19 3.23 
Hungary 0.084 0.71 40.34 0.65 4.04 9.65 1.98 7.00 3.35 5.23 
Ireland -0.076 0.36 125.52 0.56 5.00 10.51 4.40 8.00 5.15 2.90 
Lithuania -0.056 0.90 22.48 0.78 3.00 9.36 3.28 5.00 2.10 1.91 
Macedonia 0.171 0.47 19.39 0.79 2.05 8.76 0.93 7.00 5.21 1.51 
Poland 0.000 0.72 26.92 0.59 2.76 9.44 1.80 8.00 9.98 3.24 
Portugal -0.033 0.26 137.24 0.88 4.00 9.88 -0.39 3.00 5.77 3.03 
Romania 0.085 0.57 13.04 0.64 3.88 8.96 3.02 7.00 5.37 17.36 
Russia -0.054 0.08 19.86 0.22 0.00 9.34 3.38 3.00 2.81 19.26 
Slovakia -0.058 0.92 33.35 0.83 2.81 9.61 1.85 9.00 6.02 4.91 
Slovenia 0.171 0.20 43.97 0.67 2.90 9.98 1.93 5.00 14.25 3.99 
Spain 0.064 0.11 108.62 0.87 5.00 10.22 3.12 6.00 5.15 3.10 
Yugoslavia 0.171 0.44 19.37 ------ 0.00 8.64 2.15 7.00 9.40 14.43 
Total 0.024 0.42 61.85 0.67 3.43 9.71 2.28 6.16 6.04 5.59 
Note: The table summarizes various country-level characteristics used in the empirical analysis. Gender bias is the inherited gender bias by U.S. descendants of 
European immigrants (see Table 5 for details). Foreign bank share denotes the assets held by all foreign banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. 
Private credit to GDP denotes the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Bank concentration denotes the assets held 
by the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. Information sharing denotes the maximum of an index for private credit bureaus and an 
index for public credit registers. GDP per capita denotes gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. GDP growth denotes annual growth in 
gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. Creditors’ rights denotes the degree of protection of creditors’ rights. Contract enforcement 
denotes the number of days it takes to enforce a legal contract. Inflation denotes annual inflation, averaged over the past three years. See Appendix for variable 












Table 5. Country of origin and inherited gender bias 
 
 Inherited gender bias 
 Coefficient Standard error 
 (1) (2) 
Demographic characteristics 
Age 0.003* (0.002) 
Age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Education -0.029*** (0.002) 
Male 0.097*** (0.011) 
Catholic 0.101*** (0.017) 
Protestant 0.140*** (0.016) 
Employed -0.100*** (0.015) 
Unemployed -0.082*** (0.029) 
Income category -0.008*** (0.003) 
Country of origin   
Czechoslovakia -0.058* (0.036) 
Germany -0.042* (0.022) 
Greece 0.037 (0.054) 
Hungary 0.084* (0.052) 
Ireland -0.078*** (0.023) 
Lithuania -0.056 (0.069) 
Portugal -0.033 (0.061) 
Romania 0.085* (0.050) 
Russia -0.054* (0.032) 
Spain 0.064* (0.037) 
Yugoslavia 0.171** (0.085) 
Observations 6,472 
R-squared 0.18 
Note: The dependent variable is the inherited gender bias inherited by US immigrants from the period 1935-
2000. Inherited gender bias is measured from the answer to the question: “It is much better for everyone 
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” The 
answers are given on a scale from 1 to 4, which correspond to “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and 
“Strongly disagree.” The gender bias indicator is equal to 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees, and 
equal to 0 if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees. The reference group in religion is “Muslim, Hindu, 
native-American, Christian-orthodox, Judaist, and other”. The reference group in employment is “Inactive”. 
Data come from the General Social Survey. White (1980) robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, 


















Table 6. Gender and credit market access 
 
 Share working capital  
financed with bank 
credit 
Share working capital  
financed with trade 
credit 
Firm discouraged  





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female owner -0.028*** 0.010* 0.016 0.020* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) 
Small firm -0.043** -0.010 0.131*** 0.018** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.008) 
Large firm 0.028 0.014 0.023 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.011) 
Originally private 0.029** -0.006 0.012 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.024) (0.016) 
Exporter 0.028** 0.019*** -0.068*** -0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.023) (0.010) 
Competition 0.023** 0.006 -0.034 -0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.032) (0.009) 
Subsidized 0.064*** 0.012 -0.106*** -0.033*** 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.033) (0.007) 
Audited 0.022*** -0.023 -0.074** -0.025* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.031) (0.013) 
Fixed effects Country 
 Industry 
Observations 5,307 5,307 3,113 2,526 
R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.05 
Note: This table presents regression results of indicators of credit market experience by firms on firm-level 
characteristics. All firms in the final sample are individually owned or family owned. The dependent variable is 
Share working capital financed with bank credit (column (1)), Share working capital financed with trade credit 
(column (2)), Firm discouraged from applying for a loan (column (3)), and Loan application rejected (column (4)). 
Female owner is a dummy equal to 1 if the principal owner (or one of the principal owners) is a female. Small firm 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has less than 20 employees. Large firm is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has more 
than 100 employees. Originally private is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was founded as a private company rather 
than privatized. Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not have access to foreign markets. Competition is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. Subsidized is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the firm has received subsidies during the last 3 years from the central or local government. Audited is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm employs external auditing services. Omitted category for firm size is Medium firm. See 
Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. White (1980) 
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at 













Table 7. Gender and loan terms 
 





as % of loan 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female owner -0.084* 0.016 -0.018 -0.028 -0.107 
 (0.050) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.151) 
Small firm -0.216*** 0.047* 0.023 0.001 0.731*** 
 (0.068) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.214) 
Large firm 0.106 0.017 0.010 0.041 -0.757 
 (0.123) (0.027) (0.049) (0.036) (0.447) 
Originally private 0.013 -0.039 0.031 0.020 0.005 
 (0.106) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038) (0.347) 
Exporter -0.092* -0.005 0.037 0.063*** -0.819** 
 (0.046) (0.024) (0.033) (0.018) (0.362) 
Competition -0.034 -0.042 0.039* 0.010 0.256 
 (0.052) (0.035) (0.019) (0.012) (0.338) 
Subsidized 0.130** -0.032 -0.032* -0.061** -0.181 
 (0.046) (0.035) (0.016) (0.022) (0.408) 
Audited -0.015 0.020 -0.019 0.017 0.037 
 (0.062) (0.024) (0.032) (0.020) (0.298) 
Foreign bank share -0.540 -0.024 -0.166 0.093 -3.637 
 (0.418) (0.126) (0.123) (0.116) (4.703) 
Private credit to GDP -0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.040 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) 
Bank concentration 0.204 0.021 -0.124 0.071 0.272 
 (0.485) (0.175) (0.157) (0.125) (2.018) 
Information sharing 0.078* 0.004 0.027* 0.012 -0.050 
 (0.038) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.155) 
Log GDP per capita -0.267 0.034 -0.278 -0.490** 0.301 
 (0.691) (0.174) (0.283) (0.221) (3.491) 
GDP growth 0.028 0.002 0.017* 0.001 -0.052 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.093) 
Creditors’ rights -0.170** 0.003 -0.046 -0.035 0.651 
 (0.076) (0.019) (0.040) (0.028) (0.728) 
Contract enforcement 0.154** 0.007 -0.026 -0.009 -0.533 
 (0.064) (0.032) (0.037) (0.016) (0.351) 
Inflation -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.065 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.069) 
Fixed effects Country 
 Industry 
 Year 
Observations 2,158 2,199 1,708 2,189 2,119 
R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.57 
Note: This table presents regression results of loan terms on firm-level and country-level characteristics. All firms 
in the final sample are individually owned or family owned. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Days to 
negotiate loan (column (1)), Loan not collateralized (column (2)), the logarithm of Collateral as % of loan 
(column (3)), Loan in foreign currency (column (4)), and Nominal interest rate (column (5)). Female owner is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the principal owner (or one of the principal owners) is a female. Small firm is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the firm has less than 20 employees. Large firm is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has more than 100 
employees. Originally private is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was founded as a private company rather than 
privatized. Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not have access to foreign markets. Competition is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. Subsidized is a dummy equal to 1 
if the firm has received subsidies during the last 3 years from the central or local government. Audited is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm employs external auditing services. Omitted category for firm size is Medium firm. Foreign 
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bank share denotes the assets held by all foreign banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. Private 
credit to GDP denotes the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. 
Bank concentration denotes the assets held by the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial 
banks. Information sharing denotes the maximum of an index for private credit bureaus and an index for public 
credit registers. GDP per capita denotes gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. GDP 
growth denotes annual growth in gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. Creditors’ 
rights denotes the degree of protection of creditors’ rights. Contract enforcement denotes the number of days it 
takes to enforce a legal contract. Inflation denotes annual inflation, averaged over the past three years. See 
Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. White (1980) 
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance 














Table 8. Gender, culture, and credit market access  
 
 Share working 
capital financed 
with bank credit 
Share working 
capital financed 
with trade credit 
Firm discouraged  
from applying  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gender bias×Female owner -0.009 0.024*** 0.166** 0.073 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.087) (0.174) 
Female owner -0.024*** -0.001 -0.026 0.153 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.057) (0.128) 
Firm controls Yes 
Fixed effects Country 
 Industry 
Observations 5,307 5,307 3,113 2,526 
R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.12 
Note: This table presents regression results of indicators of credit market experience by firms on firm-level 
characteristics. All firms in the final sample are individually owned or family owned. The dependent variable is 
Share working capital financed with bank credit (column (1)), Share working capital financed with trade credit 
(column (2)), Firm discouraged from applying for a loan (column (3)), and Loan application rejected (column 
(4)). Gender bias is the country-level inherited gender bias estimated in Table 5. Female owner is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the principal owner (or one of the principal owners) is a female. All other variables from Table 6 are 
included in the regressions (coefficients are not reported for brevity). See Appendix for variable definitions and 
data sources. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. White (1980) robust standard errors, clustered at 
the country level, are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 

































Table 9. Gender, culture, and loan terms 
 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender bias×Female owner 0.026 -0.054 -0.054 0.428* -0.257 
 (0.101) (0.140) (0.037) (0.236) (0.242) 
Female owner -0.095 0.070 0.006 -0.435* 0.002 
 (0.078) (0.072) (0.018) (0.228) (0.170) 
Firm controls Yes 
Fixed effects Country 
 Industry 
 Year 
Observations 2,158 2,199 1,708 2,114 2,119 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.57 
Note: This table presents regression results of loan terms on firm-level and country-level characteristics. All 
firms in the final sample are individually owned or family owned. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
Days to negotiate loan (column (1)), Loan not collateralized (column (2)), the logarithm of Collateral as % of 
loan (column (3)), Loan in foreign currency (column (4)), and Nominal interest rate (column (5)). Gender bias 
is the country-level inherited gender bias estimated in Table 5. Female owner is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
principal owner (or one of the principal owners) is a female. All other variables from Table 7 are included in the 
regressions (coefficients are not reported for brevity). See Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. 
All regressions include fixed effects as specified. White (1980) robust standard errors, clustered at the country 
level, are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. 
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Table 10. Culture, gender, credit, and firm performance 
 
 
Panel A. Low gender bias countries 
 Residual log sales growth 
 Constrained = 0 Constrained = 1  Difference 
Male-owned firms 0.022 -0.060 0.082* 
Female-owned firms 0.141 0.011 0.130* 
Difference -0.119* -0.071 -0.052 
 
Panel B. High gender bias countries 
 Residual log sales growth 
 Constrained = 0 Constrained = 1  Difference 
Male-owned firms 0.038 0.032 0.006 
Female-owned firms -0.073 0.015 -0.088 
Difference 0.111* 0.018 0.093* 
 
Panel C. High gender bias countries 
 Residual log sales growth 






 0.038 0.015 0.023 
Note: The table presents the results from a two-sided Mann-Whitney t-test of the difference in firm 
performance which is not predicted by firm-level characteristics. All firms in the final sample are individually 
owned or family owned. The dependent variable, Residual log sales growth, is the difference between the 
logarithm of realised Sales growth in the past 3 years and the logarithm of Sales growth that is predicted by the 
firm-level characteristics in Table 6 (with the exception of Female) and the country and industry dummies. 
Constrained is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm applied for credit and had its loan application rejected, or if it 
was discouraged from applying by adverse credit market conditions. See Appendix for variable definitions and 


























Variables: Definitions and sources. 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Firm characteristics 
Female Dummy = 1 if the principal owner (or one of the principal owners) of the firm is a female. BEEPS 2005  
Small firm Dummy = 1 if firm has less than 20 employees. BEEPS 2005  
Medium firm Dummy = 1 if the firm has between 20 and 100 employees. BEEPS 2005  
Large firm Dummy = 1 if firm has more than 100 employees. BEEPS 2005  
Originally private Dummy = 1 if firm was founded as a private company rather than through privatization. BEEPS 2005  
Exporter Dummy = 1 if the firm has access to foreign markets. BEEPS 2005  
Competition Dummy = 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. BEEPS 2005  
Subsidized Dummy = 1 if the firm has received subsidies during the last 3 years from the central or 
local government. 
BEEPS 2005  
Audited Dummy = 1 if the firm employs external auditing services. BEEPS 2005  
Credit access 
Share working capital financed 
with bank credit 
The proportion of the firm’s working capital that has been financed by borrowing from 
private commercial banks in the past 12 months. 
BEEPS 2005  
Share working capital financed 
with trade credit 
The proportion of the firm’s working capital that has been financed with trade credit from 
suppliers or customers in the past 12 months. 
BEEPS 2005  
Firm discouraged from applying  
for a loan 
Dummy = 1 if the firm did not apply for a bank loan because it was discouraged by adverse 
credit market conditions and to 0 otherwise. Self-reported reasons for discouragement 
include: (a) application procedures are too burdensome, (b) collateral requirements are too 
high, (c) interest rates are too high, (d) informal payments are necessary, or (e) the firm did 
not think their application would be approved. 
BEEPS 2005 




Days to negotiate loan The number of days it took to negotiate the loan with the bank from the day of application. BEEPS 2005 
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Loan not collateralized Dummy = 1 if the financing of the loan did not require collateral. BEEPS 2005 
Collateral as % of loan The value of the collateral required as a percentage of the loan value. BEEPS 2005 
Loan in foreign currency Dummy = 1 if the loan is denominated in foreign currency. BEEPS 2005 
Annualized loan rate The loan’s annual rate of interest. BEEPS 2005 
Country variables 
Inherited gender bias The inherited gender bias by U.S. descendants of European immigrants. It is measured from 
the answer to the question: “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever 
outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” The answers are given 
on a scale from 1 to 4, which corresponds to “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and 
“Strongly disagree.” The gender bias indicator is equal to 1 if the respondent agrees or 
strongly agrees, and to 0 if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees. 
GSS 
Foreign bank share Assets held by all foreign banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. EBRD TR 
Private credit The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. WB FDSD 
Bank concentration The assets held by the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. WB FDSD 
Information sharing The maximum of an index for private credit bureaus and an index for public credit registers. WB DBD 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. PWT 6.3 
GDP growth Annual growth in gross domestic product per capita, average over the past three years. PWT 6.3 
Creditors’ rights  Degree of protection of creditors’ rights. WB DBD 
Contract enforcement The number of days it takes to enforce a legal contract. WB DBD 
Inflation Annual inflation, average over the past three years. EBRD TR 
Note: The Table uses the following sources: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2005; General Social Survey (GSS); 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report (2000-2005 EBRD TR); World Bank Financial Development and Structure 
Database by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2010 (WB FDSD); Penn World Tables (PWT 6.3); World Bank Doing 
Business database (WB DBD).  
 
